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GOVERNMENT FUNDING IN TITLE X PROJECTS:
CIRCUMSCRIBING THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
OF THE INDIGENT: RUST V. SULLIVAN
LINDA MAHER*
INTRODUCTION
Title X is the single largest source of public assistance to the indigent for
family planning services.1 The Public Health Services Act created Title X
which provides public funds for family planning projects.2 In 1988, the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) promulgated new
regulations that prohibited Title X project employees from engaging in
advocacy, counseling, or referral for abortion. The regulations required the
projects to maintain an objective integrity and independence from prohibited
abortion activities by the use of separate facilities, personnel, and accounting
records.3 These new requirements were an extreme departure from the
former HHS regulations, and placed heavy burdens on the fund grantees.'
New York State and the grantees believed that the new regulations would
result in a lower quality of health care for Title X's indigent clients, and that
they violated the constitutional rights of these clients, the grantees and their
* The author is an attorney who also publishes on domestic and international aspects of
biotechnology. This article is dedicated to the memory of John Maher, Founder and President
of Delancey Street Foundation, a brilliant social leader, a unique intellect and humanitarian, who
was much loved by those who knew him.
1. New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401, 404 (2d Cir. 1989). See Massachusetts v.
Secretary of Health and Human Services, 899 F.2d 53, 56 (Ist Cir. 1990) (en bane) (holding
that regulations altering interpretations of Title X by prohibiting non-directive abortion
counseling or referral, and greater program separation were unconstitutional).
2. Public Health Services Act, §§ 1002, 1008, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300(a)-300(a-6)
[hereinafter the Act].
3. 42 C.F.R. §§ 59.8, 59.9, and 59.10 (1992), construed in, Rust v. Sullivan, 11 S. Ct.
1759, 1765 (1991).
4. Section 1008 of the Act provides: "None of the funds appropriated under this subehapter
shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning." 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6
(1992). New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d at 404. The original interpretation of this section
permitted Title X projects to provide information about, and referral for abortions, including
names and addresses of abortion clinics. Such interpretations were considered neutral, as mere
referral or collection of statistical data did not contradict section 1008, and were first permitted
and then required by HHS. Id. at 405 (citing U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH EDUCATION &
WELFARE, PROGRAM INCENTIVES FOR PROJECT GRANTS FOR FAMvILY PLANNING SERVICES
(1976); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PROGRAM GUIDEUINES FOR
PROJECT GRANTS FOR FAMILY PLANNING SERVICES § 8.6 (1981)).
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staff.5 They appealed adverse decisions in the lower courts, and in May of
1991, the Supreme Court affirmed these holdings in Rust v. Sullivan.6 The
Court understood that the new regulations were a departure from former
practice, but they held that they did not violate the constitutional rights of the
parties and so were valid discretionary interpretive acts of the Secretary of
HHS. 7
Dr. Rust and his co-petitioner's were recipient grantee-providers of
family planning funds under Title X and doctors who supervised Title X
projects. The State of New York was also a grantee through the New York
State Department of Health (NYSDOH) and had distributed nearly $6 million
in Title X funds to 37 agencies. New York City also participated through
its Health and Hospitals Corporation. New York, and Dr. Rust brought two
suits challenging the new regulations, and these were later consolidated.8
Dr. Rust had previously obtained injunctive relief against implementation of
the revised regulations, and after case consolidation moved for summary
judgement.9
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
upheld the regulations.1" The court concluded that "the new regulations,
despite their significant changes from the guidelines, are supported by
sufficiently reasonable grounds that they should not be set aside as arbitrary
or capricious. " " Further, the Court held that the regulations did not
impermissibly interfere with the indigent client's First and Fifth Amendment
rights to receive information about abortion services, or the grantee-
providers' First Amendment rights to discuss abortion.12
5. New York v. Bowen, 690 F. Supp. 1261 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd sub nom., New York
v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1989), aff'd sub nom., in Rust v. Sullivan, 111 . Ct. 1759(1991); New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d at 406-07 (discussing the summary of challenges).
6. Il S. Ct. 1759 (1991). The State of New York declined to continue the appeal, and
HHS Secretary Bowen was succeeded by Secretary Sullivan. Dr. Rust, and the other plaintiffs
then sued both New York and the Secretary of HHS.
7. 111 S. Ct. at 1767-69. But see Henry J. Reske & Mark Hansen, House Reacts to Rust
Decision, A.B.A. J. 108 (Oct. 1991) (stating "the ABA House of Delegates in August approved
without opposition a measure supporting the right of health-care clinics to counsel on abortion").
8. New York v. Sullivan 889 F.2d at 406. The actions consolidated were, New York v.
Bowen, No. 88-0701 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (order granting preliminary injunction) and Rust v.
Bowen, No. 88-0702 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (order granting preliminary injunction).
9. Bowen, 690 F. Supp. at 1263.
10. Id. at 1274. The court denied the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, and
granted the defendant's. At the district court, Dr. Rust had argued that the new regulations
frustrated the intent of Congress, violated the letter and intent of Title X, and worked a
deprivation of First and Fifth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs raised four central issues: 1)
whether the regulations were view-point discriminatory; 2) whether they censored speech; 3)
whether the prohibitions on abortion counseling within Title X projects violated the First and
Fifth Amendment rights of women who were pregnant; and 4) whether the regulations affecting
counseling and advocacy infringed the First Amendment rights of the Title X grantees. Id. at
1265.
11. Id. at 1272.
12. Id. at 1273.
[Vol. 29
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In his review before the Court of Appeals Dr. Rust was also unsuccess-
ful.13 He had again argued that the new regulations violated both the
language and the intent of Title X and deprived both the grantees and the
indigent recipients of their constitutional rights. The government, the
appellants argued, "may not condition receipt of a benefit on the relinquish-
ment of constitutional rights."14 The court said, however, that participants
in Title X projects remain free to say whatever they wish about abortion
outside the project. The situation, they hinted, might be different if the state
barred doctors who performed abortions in private facilities from the use of
public facilities."5
The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, and held that
the regulations were a permissible construction of Sections 1006 (a), and
1008 of the Public Health Service Act.' The Secretary did not need to cite
any abuses under the prior regulations in order to justify the statutory
revisions.17 Further, the Secretary's admission that the changes were in
response to a shift in political climate did not affect the validity of the revised
regulations. 8 The new regulations, the Court implied, were not an affirma-
tive legal barrier to abortion nor a facial violation of the plaintiffs' right to
free speech.' Therefore, a woman's and her doctor's rights to privacy and
free speech about abortion were not violated by the new regulations.
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of these regulations.
According to the reasoning of the majority, the selective use of the public
funding process to prohibit abortion counseling, referral and advocacy but
allow the same for all other forms of family planning, is a legitimate use of
state power.' The decision, the majority said, left the indigent client
wanting an abortion, with the same choices as if Congress had never funded
family planning services.2' The effective preclusion of the Title X client's
right to abortion was accomplished by her own indigence, the majority said,
13. New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1989).
14. Id. at 412 (distinguishing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972)) (holding that the
non-renewal of a non-tenured State university professor, based on his exercise of free speech
violates the 14th Amendment, due process, since no hearing was afforded, and there was an
expectation of contract renewal).
15. Id. at 412-13 (referring to Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972)).
16. Id. at 414.
17. Id. at 418 (Kearse, J., dissenting). Since no abuses were cited it follows that such
enumeration was not required.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 411-13.
20. Rust v. Sullivan, I11 S. Ct. at 1764-66 (defining the regulations), and at 1769, 1775(explaining the court's findings). The Secretary has the authority to make Title X grants "'in
accordance with such regulations as [he] may promulgate.'" Id. at 1767 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
300a4). Title X empowers the Secretary "'to make grants and enter into contracts ... to assist
in the establishment and operation of voluntary family planning projects which shall offer a
broad range of acceptable and effective family planning methods and services.'" Id. (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 300a). This power is subject to disallowance of expenditures for programs where
abortion is used as a method of family planning. Id. at 1764-65.
21. 111 S. Ct. at 1778.
1992]
3
Maher: Government Funding in Title X Projects: Circumscribing the Consti
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1992
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
and not by the decision of the court.' Further, the majority said, the
doctor patient relationship was not disturbed as the indigent clients would
know that the limited advice given by the physician, avoiding any mention
of abortion, would be the result of the regulations.' The High Court said,
"[i]t would undoubtedly be easier for a woman seeking an abortion if she
could receive information about abortion from the Tide X project, but the
Constitution does not require that the Government distort the scope of its
mandated program in order to provide that information."'
This article argues that the majority characterized Dr. Rust's allegations
as devoid of constitutionally based issues. As evidenced by the split in the
federal courts and the Supreme Court's own dissenting opinions, the
Secretary's regulations raised serious questions involving fundamental
freedoms. Because other constructions of the Act, not touching on First and
Fifth Amendment constitutional rights remained available, the majority
misapplied the rules of statutory construction. Further, the majority invaded
the constitutional rights of the grantee-providers and the client-recipients of
Title X programs, based on the presence of some federal co-funding and a
government desire to restrict speech content. The intent of the Congress as
illuminated through the Act, the legislative history, and prior experience and
regulations all speak to a contrived political result in the majority's decision.
The Supreme Court moves outside its realm when it legislates from the
bench.'
Conditioning the benefits of public health care projects on the relinquish-
ment of the indigent's and the providers' guaranteed rights is unconstitution-
al. Such limits on fundamental rights cannot be construed as a funding
prerequisite, and the government cannot silence diversity in America by
buying up fundamental rights?6
The decision leaves the impression that the majority believes that since
the poor should be gratefully for whatever assistance they get, legislated
comprehensive family planning is not necessary for them. The Court and not
the Act has ordained this result. A single administrative agency's regula-
tions, which disallows the physician from speaking to an indigent client on
all medical options, under the auspices of a congressional Act proclaimed to
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1776.
24. Id. at 1777.
25. See Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1789 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (implying that when the Court
tells a coordinate branch of the government what it can and cannot do, the Court acts at the
limits of its power).
26. See 111 S. Ct. at 1778-79, 1782-83 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See generally Carole
I. Chervin, The Title XFamily Planning Gag Rule: Can The Government Buy Up Constitutional
Rights, 41 STANFORD L. REv. 401, 408 (1989) (concluding that the government cannot infringe
on privacy rights by censored government subsidized speech); Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of
Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1185(1990) (discussing cases that have tried to condition government benefits, e.g., unemployment
compensation, and abortion).
[Vol. 29
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be part of a broad based comprehensive health care program, are arbitrary
and capricious.'
This article concludes that single agency, interpretive regulations may
not capture and gerrymander an Act of Congress to suit an administrative
Secretary's view of how people should live. The Public Health Services Act
was meant to deliver broad-based medical services independent of viewpoint,
and government control of free speech, and the Secretary's regulations
impermissibly interfere with the Title X client's First and Fifth Amendment
rights to receive information, and their right of self determination in
reproductive planning. The regulations also infringed the First and Fifth
Amendment rights of the indigent client's doctors and their staff, by allowing
minor government offices to use regulatory schemes to interject themselves
into the federally protected professional relationships of doctors and their
patients. 8
The article examines the background of the case, the Second Circuit
decision, and the Supreme Court decision. It offers an analysis of the cases,
relevant statutes, regulations, and the legislative history as they reflect on
First and Fifth Amendment rights, and constitutional avoidance through the
use of statutory construction.
It also discusses the imminent changes now anticipated by the recent
electoral mandate which swept Bill Clinton into office and formally ended the
reign of conservative and religious factions in American politics. A way
must be found to limit the opportunity for such extraordinary swings in
philosophy as expounded by the instrumentality of state or city administrative
offices.
Similar to the resistance some local governments displayed to meaningful
adoption of the federal anti-discrimination statutes in the 1960s, permitting
such extraordinary reinterpretations of Title X by local administrative
agencies infringes the prerogative of Congress to legislate effectively. Gross
divergence from established federal political goals by local regulatory
re-interpretation impacts directly on people's lives, their means to assert their
constitutional rights, and their basic health care services. It also burdens
27. Seeid. at 1786 (citing Justice Marshall's dissent in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980)). Harris held that Title XIX does not require States to pay for medically necessary
abortions). "While technically leaving intact the fundamental right protection in Roe v. Wade,
the Court, 'through a relentlessly formalistic catechism,' once again has rendered the right's
substance nugatory." Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1786 (citation omitted). See also id. at 1787 (Stevens,
J., dissenting, clarifying the scope of the Act); id. at 1789 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, calling
the Secretary's interpretation unreasonable); New York v. Bowen, 690 F. Supp. at 1264
(discussing the comprehensive nature of the Act); New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d at 415
(Kearse, J., dissenting, referring to the decision as arbitrary and capricious).
28. If administrative agencies wish to influence public opinion they have options that do not
raise constitutional questions. Constructive educational and privately financed non-abortion
alternative support programs could be used to encourage view-point acceptance among the
government subsidized indigent in family health planning projects. For instance, racial integra-
tion, education and awareness has been promoted by federal agencies in the past, as well as by
equal employment opportunities.
1992]
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cities and states across the nation, in terms of budgetary planning, contract
formation, manpower efforts and implementation costs.
I. RUST V. SU.LlVAN
A. Background
Title X of the Public Health Services Act authorizes the Secretary to
"make grants to and enter into contracts with public or nonprofit private
entities to assist in the establishment and operation of voluntary family
planning projects which shall offer a broad range of acceptable and effective
family planning methods and services."" These grants and contracts must
"be made in accordance with such regulations as the Secretary may promul-
gate."' However, "[n]one of the funds appropriated under this subchapter
shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning."31
In 1988 the Secretary of the Health and Human Services issued new
regulations that prohibited Title X projects from engaging in counseling,
referral, or advocacy of abortion rights. 2 These regulations required
separate facilities for abortion, and non-abortion service activities, including
counseling.33 Previously, these separate service programs were permitted
to share facilities within the same building.' The Secretary cited no abuses
as a reason for the change. He stated that the interpretive changes were
made in response to the political climate. 5 He explained his determination
in light of critical reports from the offices of General Accounting, and the
Inspector General.' These executive branch reports claimed prior policy
failed to implement the statute properly, and that it was necessary to provide
"clear and operational guidance to grantees to preserve the distinction
between Title X programs and abortion as a method of family planning."37
The Secretary stated but did not explain that the change was justified by
client experience, and supported by a shift in attitude against the "elimination
of unborn children by abortion.""
29. Public Health Service Act, 84 Stat. 1508, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 300(a).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 300(a-4).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 300(a-6).
32. 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(1) and § 59. 10(a) (1989).
33. 42 C.F.R. § 59.7 (1989).
34. Bowen, 1690 F. Supp. at 1264, 1271-73 (discussing 42 C.F.R. § 59.9).
35. 53 Fed. Reg. 2923-2924 (1988).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. The Secretary did not define the term "unborn children" as to whether he was
referring to first trimester abortions or later stage abortions.
[Vol. 29
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A suit was brought to prevent application of the new regulations and to
challenge their implementation through injunctive relief.39 The plaintiffs
included several Title X grantee-providers, the State of New York, which
receives Title X funds through the New York State Department of Health;
the City of New York; the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation;
Planned Parenthood of New York City, Inc.; Planned Parenthood of
Westchester/Rockland; Medical and Health Research Association of New
York City, Inc.; Health Services of Hudson County, New Jersey; and Dr.
Irving Rust and Dr. Melvin Padawer, doctors who supervise Title X
programs who sued on behalf of themselves and their patients. The
defendant was the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services, Otis R. Bowen, and his successor Louis W. Sullivan.
The Secretary promulgated the new regulations on February 2, 1988.
Although Title X projects never performed or subsidized abortions,' the
previous administrative interpretation at first permitted and then required the
projects to provide information about and referrals for abortion.41 Title X
projects, therefore, traditionally included neutral counseling about abortion.
These earlier practices permitted the accumulation of information on abortion
services, and the related collection of statistical health data. The former test
used under previous regulations, was whether the immediate effect of a
health service activity, such as counseling on abortion and its consequences,
encouraged abortion.42
B. The Second Circuit Decision
The plaintiffs brought two suits challenging the new regulations of the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), New Yorkv. Bowen, No.
88-0701, and Rust v. Bowen, No. 88-0702.13 Dr. Rust and his co-plaintiffs
sought declaratory and injunctive relief against implementation of the new
interpretative regulations. The cases were consolidated and the United States
District Court for the Southern District upheld the regulations.
In affirming the district court's summary judgment for the Secretary, the
Court of Appeals held that the regulations were a permissible construction of
39. 690 F. Supp. at 1263. NYSDOH funding was about $6 million in 1987-1988, and Dr.
Rust of Planned Parenthood in New York received about $325,000 from NYS for family
planning services.
40. 42 C.F.R. § 5 9.5(a)(9) (1992) (stating "the project will not provide abortion as a method
of family planning.")
41. New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d at 405 (citing U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUC. &
WELFARE, PROGRAM INCENTIVES FOR PROJECT GRANTS FOR FAMILY PLANNING SERVICES
(1976), and U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PROGRAM GUIDELINES FOR
PROJECT GRANTS FOR FAMILY PLANNING SERVICES § 8.6 (1981)).
42. 889 F.2d at 405. Mere referral for abortion giving both names and addresses was
considered "non-directive" counseling. However, counseling that urged abortion, or the
provision of transportation to abortion facilities were considered violative of § 1008.
43. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
1992]
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the statute and consistent with the First and Fifth Amendments.' The court
determined that the regulations were not affirmative legal barriers to abortion
and did not amount to facial violations of the plaintiffs' rights to free
speech.' Title X, the court said, was limited to preconception services,
and so the program, the Court of Appeals reasoned, did not provide services
related to childbirth except in the context of referral because of pregnancy. 46
In that circumstance the projects must refer the pregnant client to a provider
that promotes the welfare of the mother and the child. Further, the referral
provider list may not be used to directly or indirectly encourage abortion,, 7
such as by including on the list of referral providers health care providers
whose principal business is the provision of abortions.' The regulations
44. 889 F.2d at 404. See generally Steve Alumbaugh & C.K. Rowland, The Links Between
Platform-Based Appointment Criteria and Trial Judges'Abortion Judgments, 74 JUDIcATURE 153(1990)(discussing the relationship of view-point politics and judicial appointment. Executive
policy to favor a particular point of view may be reflected in appointments and may impact on
cases like Rust v. Sullivan, where view-point politics seem to be controlling).
45. See 889 F.2d at 411.
46. See id. at 405 (discussing 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(1)).
47. The regulations permit the grantee to give a woman a list of prenatal care service
providers which might include some who offer abortions. See 889 F.2d at 416 (Kearse, J.,
dissenting) comments on the list requirements found at 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(3). The list must
comply with several requirements: 1) it must include any available prenatal care providers that
do not perform abortion; 2) it cannot include providers that offer abortion as their "principal
business;" 3) it cannot weigh in favor of abortion providers. In accordance with 42 C.F.R. §
59.8(a)(3), the woman may not be informed as to which providers on the list also perform
abortions. rd. § 59.8(a)(2) states that, "once a client served by a Title X project is diagnosed
as pregnant, she must be referred for appropriate prenatal and/or social services by furnishing
a list of available providers that promote the welfare of mother and the unborn child." Id.
(emphasis removed).
"Thus the expressed prescription and proscriptions in the regulations require the grantee
to emphasize prenatal care and prohibit it from identifying any entity as a provider of
abortions." Id.
48. 889 F.2d at 416 (discussing 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(b)(4)). 42 C.F.R. § 59.10(a) disallows
the use of Title X funds for activities that encourage, promote or advocate abortion, and
provides a number of examples of what the Secretary now considers inappropriate under TitleX:
(a) A Title X project may not encourage, promote or advocate abortion as a method
of family planning. This requirement prohibits actions to assist women to obtain
abortions or increase the availability or accessibility of abortion for family planning
purposes. Prohibited actions include the use of Title X project funds for the
following:
(1) Lobbying for the passage of legislation to increase in any way the
availability of abortion as a method of family planning;(2) Providing speakers to promote the use of abortion as a method of
family planning;(3) Paying dues to any group that as a significant part of its activities
advocates abortion as a method of family planning;(4) Using legal action to make abortion available in any way as a method
of family planning; and
(5) Developing or disseminating in any way materials (including printed
matter and audiovisual materials) advocating abortion as a method of family
planning.
8
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required that Title X referrals cannot be made to an abortion provider even
if requested by the client. A question even arose as to whether the keeping
of the yellow pages was appropriate for a Title X facility, least a client
should request it to attempt to locate an abortion provider.49
Aside from the restriction on provision of information, lobbying for
legislation to increase the availability of abortion as a method of family
planning, even if it were medically proven that abortion was the safest form
of birth control for women, is not permitted. Development or dissemination
of materials advocating abortion, providing speakers to promote abortion as
a method of family planning, or using any legal action to make abortion
available in any way, are all prohibited. 5' Further, the court stated that a
program that counsels on the use of a particular contraceptive device plainly
treats that device as a "method of family planning."51
C. The United States Supreme Court Decision
1. The Majority
The Supreme Court granted certiori to resolve the split among the Courts
of Appeal. The First and Tenth Circuits had invalidated the Secretary's new
regulations, the Second Circuit upheld them.52 The Supreme Court's
majority decision included Justices Rehnquist, White, Kennedy, Scalia, and
Souter, in favor of the constitutionality of the regulations, and engendered
three dissents. In the opinion, authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the
majority rejected Dr. Rust's argument that the regulations were arbitrary and
capricious. Justice Rehnquist held that the Secretary's new regulations were
a permissible construction of Title X; that the regulations did not violate the
First Amendment free speech rights of the Title X fund grantee-providers,
or their staffs, nor impermissibly infringe on the doctor-patient relationship;
and that the regulations did not violate a woman's First Amendment rights
by the imposition of viewpoint-discriminatory conditions tied to government
49. 889 F.2d at 406.
50. 42 C.F.R. § 59.10(a). See 889 F.2d at 408 (citing Jewel Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local
No. 6167, United Mine Workers of America, 325 U.S. 161, 168-69 (1945)) (discussing the Fair
Labor Standards Act). The Court relied on this case for its holding that general remarks found
in the legislative history are not probative of Congressional intent on narrow issues.
51. 889 F.2d at 407.
52. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1764 (1991). Massachusetts v. Secretary of HHS,
899 F.2d 53 (1st Cir. 1990) (denying the validity of the regulations in part on constitutional
munds). See supra note 1 on the court's holding; Planned Parenthood Federation v. Sullivan,
13 F.2d 1492 (10th Cir. 1990) (denying the validity of the regulations as unconstitutional); and
New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1989) (validating the regulations).
53. 111 S. Ct. at 1764. Justice Blackrmun filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice
Marshall, Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor in various parts. Id. at 1778.
1992]
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subsidies, or her Fifth Amendment right to choose whether to terminate
pregnancy.'
The majority recognized that the statute which prohibited the use of
funds under Title X in which abortion is a method of family planning was
ambiguous with regard to abortion counseling, referral, advocacy, and
program integrity.55 According to the Chief Justice, the construction of the
statute by the administrative agency responsible for its administration, must
be accorded substantial weight.' Further, he found that the Secretary's
construction may not be disturbed as an abuse of discretion if it is a
permissible or plausible construction of the plain language of the statute, and
does not conflict with the intent of Congress.57
The majority said the administrative agency's interpretation of the statute
and their resulting regulations, were entitled to deference, notwithstanding
the fact that they reversed a long-standing agency policy permitting non-
directive counseling and referral for abortion. 5 The change of interpreta-
54. Id. at 1767-78. See also id. at 1778 (where Justice Blackmun countered in the dissent
that "[c]asting aside established principles of statutory construction and administrative
jurisprudence, the majority in these cases today unnecessarily passes upon important questions
of constitutional law. In doing so, the Court, for the first time, upholds viewpoint-based
suppression of speech solely because it is imposed on those dependent upon the Government for
economic support." He stated further that, "the majority upholds direct regulation of dialogue
between a pregnant woman and her physician . . .").
55. Id. at 1768 (citing Massachusetts v. Sullivan, 899 F.2d 53, 62 (1st Cir. 1990))
(reasoning that Congress had not specifically addressed the scope of the abortion prohibition).
See supra notes 1, 52, and infra 144 and the accompanying text. "Mhe contemporaneous
legislative history does not address whether clinics receiving Title X funds can engage in non-
directive counseling including the abortion option and referrals." Id. at 1768 (citing Planned
Parenthood Federation v. Sullivan, 913 F.2d 1492, 1497 (10th Cir. 1990)). See supra notes 1,
52, 55, and infra 144 and accompanying texts.
56. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1767 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)). The Court's holding in this area is quite confusing
when looked at from the perspective of other recent rulings. Justice Scalia's recent discussion
in Boureslan v. Arabian American Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991), for instance. The case
specifically addressed the degree of deference due to an administrative agency with oversight
responsibilities. In Boureslan, the Court came to exactly the opposite conclusion. There, the
Court held that the construction of a statute by the agency responsible for its administration was
not permitted deference. Justice Scalia reproached the Court for throwing the entire question
of administrative deference into abeyance. Id. at 1236-37 (Scalia, J., concurring).
57. Rust, I I1 . Ct. at 1767-69.
58. Id. at 1768-69. Although the new regulations may have reversed long standing policy
that permitted non-directive, counseling and referral for abortion, and represented a sharp break
from prior construction, the Court held that the prior constitutionally consistent interpretation
was not entitled to substantial weight. Id. at 1769 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 862, 863-64)
(holding that a revised statute interpretation deserves deference. This is because "'[n initial
agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone,' and 'the agency, to engage in informed
rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing
basis.'") Id. at 1769 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863-64). An agency is not required to
"establish rules of conduct to last forever." But see Justice Scalia's comments as well as the
dissents in Boureslan v. Aramco (here the court refused to recognize any deference to the
administering agency, in part because the revisions were not contemporaneous with the
legislation).
10
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tion, Justice Rehnquist said, was amply supported by "reasoned analysis"59
indicating that the new regulations were more in keeping with the statute's
original intent, and justified by client experience, and accorded with a shift
in attitude against the "elimination of unborn by abortion. "'
The majority said that the new regulations prohibiting grantees-providers
of Title X funds from engaging in abortion counseling, referral, and
advocacy represented a permissible construction of the statute. 1  The
majority rejected the contention that the plain language of Section 1008 only
forbade the performance of abortions in Title X projects. 2 Justice Rehn-
quist agreed with the reasoning of the lower court that "it would be wholly
anomalous to read Section 1008 to mean that a program that merely counsels
but does not perform abortions does not include abortion as a method of
family planning."'
The majority commented that the prohibited activities of abortion
counseling, referral, and provision of information regarding abortion as a
method of family planning do not on their face bar abortion referral or
counseling where a woman's life is placed in imminent peril by her pregnan-
cy.' Such counseling, Justice Rehnquist said, could not be considered a
"method of family planning."' Provision in the regulations, he added,
contemplated that Title X recipients may engage in otherwise prohibited
abortion-related activates in such circumstances.'
The new regulations, the majority said, which interpret that Title X
recipients are prohibited from engaging in abortion as a method of family
planning did not violate the grantee-providers', their staff's or their patient's
First Amendment right of free speech.67 Therefore, according to the
59. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1769 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983)).
60. Id. at 1769. See also Geri J. Yonover, Fighting Fire With Fire: Civil RICO and Anti-
Abortion Activists, 12 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 153 (1990) (discussing the nature of the "shift
in attitude" described by the court in Rust v. Sullivan, and the civil disruptions staged by anti-
abortionist activists).
61. 111 S. Ct. at 1769. A permissible construction is not the only one the agency could
have reached, or even the one the court would have reached on the question.
62. Id. at 1766 (citing the appeals court decision, and later, affirming it).
63. Id. (quoting New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d at 407).
64. Id. at 1773.
65. Id.
66. Id. The Court found that the regulations contemplated that a Title X project would be
permitted to engage in abortion referral in emergencies under 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(2) (1989).
A specific exemption for emergency care requires recipients "to refer the client immediately to
an appropriate provider of emergency medical services." Further, Section 59.5(b)(1) also
requirs projects to provide "necessary referral to other medical facilities when medicallyidicated."
67. Id. at 1771-75. The majority stated their only concerned was with whether on their face,
the regulations were authorized by the Act, and could be construed without infringing
constitutionally protected rights. Id. at 1767. "A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of
course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish
that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid. The fact that [the
regulations] might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is
1992]
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majority the new regulations do not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint,
and further, that it is the legitimate providence of government, to choose to
fund one activity to the exclusion of another.61 The new regulations,
therefore, merely insured that Title X funds would not be used outside the
scope of the federal program. In considering whether the new regulations
interfered with the grantee-providers' employee's rights to free speech, the
majority said that the regulations did not in any way restrict the employee's
freedom of expression.'" The majority reasoned that the limitation on their
speech was acceptable as a consequence of their decision to accept employ-
ment in Title X projects.7' Similarly the fact that Title X requires govern-
ment and grantee-providers to help finance Title X projects by matching
funds did not affect the reasoning of the majority.7'
The majority held that the regulations do not condition receipt of public
funds in Title X programs on the relinquishment of a constitutional right,
such as the First Amendment right to engage in abortion advocacy and
counseling, because the regulations did not force the Title X grantees, or
their employees to give up abortion-related activities.' The Court said,
they "remain free ... to pursue abortion-related activities when they are not
acting under the auspices of the Title X project"'
The majority added that the regulations do not violate a woman's Fifth
Amendment right to choose whether to terminate her pregnancy.7' Nor do
they impermissibly burden a woman's right to an abortion.75 The majority
reasoned that this is true, because the "the Due Process Clauses generally
confer no affirmative right to government aid, even where such aid may be
necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government
insufficient to render [them] wholly invalid." Id. (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.
739, 745 (1987)). See generally Helen McGee Konrad, Comment, Eliminating Distinctions
Between Commercial and Political Speech: Replacing Regulation With Government Counter-
speech, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1129 (1990) (discussing free speech and commercial speech
aspects of abortion service providers and the traditional First Amendment protections afforded
each).
68. 111 S. Ct. at 1775.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1775-76, In the past, the Court had recognized that a mere subsidy in the form
of government owned property, did not justify restrictions of speech in areas that had "been
traditionally open to the public for expressing activity." Id. at 1776 (quoting United States v.
Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3119 (1990)).
Justice Rehnquist indicated that "It could be argued by analogy that traditional relationships
such as that between doctor and patient should enjoy protection under the First Amendment from
government regulation, even when subsidized by the government." The Chief Justice went on
to add, however, that "[w]e need not resolve that question here, however, because the Title X
program regulations do not significantly impinge upon the doctor-patient relationship." Id. at
1776.
72. Id. at 1775.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1776-77.
75. Id. at 1776.
[Vol. 29
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itself may not deprive the individual."'76 The government, Justice Rehnquist
concluded, has no constitutional duty to subsidize an activity merely because
it is constitutionally protected.'
The regulations, Justice Rehnquist added, did not violate a woman's Fifth
Amendment right to make an informed decision regarding health care."78
This was true, he reasoned, because the "doctor's ability to provide, and a
women's right to receive" abortion information, is protected outside the scope
of Title X programs. 9 The fact that most woman will be dissuaded from
abortion as a practical choice as a result of their own indigence did not speak
to a government imposed restriction.'o Nor, Justice Rehnquist felt, did the
regulations impermissibly infringe upon the doctor-patient relationship and
thereby deprive the Title X client of information concerning abortion."1
The majority said that the restrictions on abortion related activities were
permissible because they did not condition the receipt of a benefit on the
76. Id. (quoting Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989)). But see
generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections On Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J.
1281 (1991). "Because the social organization of reproduction is a major bulwark of women's
social inequality, any constitutional interpretation of a sex equality principle must prohibit laws,
state policies, or official practices and acts that deprive women of reproductive control or punish
women for their reproductive role or capacity." Id. at 1319.
77. In Webster, the Court upheld a Missouri statute providing that no public facilities or
employees be used to perform abortions, and that physicians conduct viability tests prior to
performing abortions. Webster emphasized that so long as no affirmative legal obstacle to
abortion services was created by a denial of the use of governmental money, facilities, or
personnel, the practical effect of such a denial on the availability of such services is
constitutionally irrelevant. See the discussion of Webster in Rust, Ill S. Ct. at 1776-77 (citing
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept., of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989)) (holding
that a State's failure to protect a child from parental violence, does not violate due process
because the State had no duty). The Court reasoned that in this line of cases, the State's
decision to use public facilities and staff to encourage childbirth over abortion places no
governmental obstacle in the path of a woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy. See 111
S. Ct. at 1776 (citing to Harris Sec. of H.H.S. v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980)) (reasoning
that unequal subsidization encourages alternative activity deemed in the public interest).
See also Christopher A. Cramin, Judicial Restraint and the Non-Decision in Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services, 13 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 263 (1990) (discussing the odd
balance and implications of the Justice's decisions and their refusal to implicate Roe v. Wade)
and James Bopp Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, Webster and the Future of Substantive Due Process,
28 DUQ. L. REV. 271 (1990) (discussing the impact of Webster on privacy rights and Roe v.
Wade, arguing that it works a de facto reversal). Compare Thomas A. Eaton & Michael L.
Wells, Governmental Inaction as a Constitutional Tort: DeShaney and its Aftermath, 66 WASH.
L. REV. 107 (1991) (examiningthe trend towards non scrutiny of the State's role in exposing
individuals to harm, and arguing that due process may require State protection). See generally
LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990) (supporting pro-choice and
public funding of abortion, and proposing a compromise of greater support for programs which
improve contraception, and social support for families with children).
78. 111 S. Ct. at 1777.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1777-78.
81. Id. at 1776.
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relinquishment of a constitutional right.' According to Justice Rehnquist, the
program funds are merely separate from other funding to preserve the integrity
of Title X programs.'
Justice Rehnquist said, "[i]t would undoubtedly be easier for a woman
seeking an abortion if she could receive information about abortion from a Title
X project... "I However, he asserted that the regulations leave the indigent
women with the same choices as if government had not chosen to fund family
planning at all. '
2. The Dissent
Justice Blackmun was joined in part, by Justice Marshall, Justice Stevens,
and Justice O'Connor, in firmly pronouncing that the new Health and Human
Services Regulations, raised serious First and Fifth Amendment concerns, and
that the Court of Appeals should have invalidated the regulation.' Attacking
the majority's concept of statutory construction and administrative legislation,
Justice Blackmun found fault with the pretense that "the Government may
attach an otherwise unconstitutional condition to the receipt of a public
benefit.. ."1 He cited a number of cases which illustrated the proper
construction, and provided the direction with which to narrow the permissible
interpretations. "[F]ederal statutes," he continued, "are to be so construed as
to avoid serious doubt of their constitutionality. " 8
82. 111 S. Ct. at 1773-74 (distinguishing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).
In Perry the Court held "[E]ven though the government may deny [a] . . . benefit for any
number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may
not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected inter-
ests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech."). Perry, 408 U.S. at 597.
83. 111 S. Ct. at 1774.
84. 111 S. Ct. at 1777.
85. Id. at 1778.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1778-79. Justice Blackmun believed the regulations impose view-point re-
strictions. Other commentators have addressed an ideological shift on the court, which would
reflect in view-point jurisprudence. See generally Lynne Henderson, Authoritarianism and the
Rule of Law, 66 IND. L.J. 379 (1991). "While many liberal-progressive constitutional scholars
have noted the 'conservative' shift in the Court's decisions and are voicing concern and
proposing alternative strategies, it is the thesis of this Article that the problem is authoritarian-
ism, not conservatism per se." Id. at 379.
88. 111 S. Ct. at 1778 (citing International Ass'n Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749
(1961) (voiding forced membership in a union shop agreement) supporting the idea that statutory
construction must avoid constitutional doubts, accord, Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657
(1895) (holding that the 14th Amendment's right to contract does not permit the making of
contracts forbidden by State Constitution); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)
(discussing the Longshoreman's and Harbor Workers Compensation Act); and United States v.
Security Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 78 (1982) (holding that the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 could not be applied retroactively). Justice Blackmun notes that the majority did not "deny
that the principle is fully applicable" to Rust, where a "plausible but constitutionally suspect
statutory interpretation is embodied in an administrative regulation." Id. at 1778. Edward J.
DeBartolo Corp., 485 U.S. at 575 (reasoning that an act of Congress ought not to be construed
to violate the Constitution if any other possible construction remains available).
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The role of the Court, according to Justice Blackmun, is not to "sidestepi]"
this canon of construction with "feeble excuse[s] that the challenged regulations
'do not raise the sort of grave and doubtful constitutional questions,'"
9
Justice Blackmun argued that "[w]hether or not one believe[d] the Regulations
[were] valid, it avoids reality to contend that they do not give rise to serious
constitutional questions."' To Justice Blackmun the question raised by the
regulations, squarely addressed the issue of dual standards of constitutional
rights with lower standards being allotted to the indigent of our country. To
Justice Blackmun, the majority's statement: "[t]here is no question but that the
statutory prohibition contained in section 1008 is constitutional," simply begs
the question.91
Furthermore, Justice Blackmun rejected the majority's limited approach in
justifying the regulations as a permissible administrative agency interpreta-
tion.' To Justice Blackmun and other of the dissenters, the Court's duty
speaks to avoiding "passing unnecessarily upon important constitutional ques-
tions ... where. . . the language of the statute is decidedly ambiguous."'
Justice Blackmun said, "[i]t is both logical and eminently prudent to assume
that when Congress intends to press the limits of constitutionality in its
enactments, it will express that intent in explicit and unambiguous terms."'
Justice Blackmun closes his first point in stating that because he concludes that
a plainly constitutional construction of section 1008 "is not only 'fairly
possible' but entirely reasonable."' He would reverse the judgment of the
Court of Appeals on that ground alone without deciding the constitutionality of
the Secretary's regulations.'
Justice Blackmun's dissent also pointed out that until this decision
"viewpoint-based suppression of speech. . .conditioned upon the acceptance
of public funds" had never been upheld by the High Court. 7 For Justice
Blackmun, whatever the government's power to condition receipt of public
funds, "it surely does not extend to a condition that suppresses the recipient's
cherished freedom of speech based solely upon the content or viewpoint of that
89. 111 S. Ct. at 1778 (quoting United States v. Delaware and Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366,
408 (1909)) (discussing the Hepburn Act).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1779 n.l. Since the language of § 1008 does not address counseling, referral,
advocacy, or program integrity, the regulations easily sustains a constitutionally trouble-free
interpretation. Id. Yet, Justice Blackmun's dissent points out, the majority rejected a
constitutionally sound construction for one that "is by no means clearly constitutional."
92. Id. at 1778.
93. Id. at 1779.
94. Id. at 1779-80 (citing Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2113 (1990)). "It is thus implausible that, after Chevron, agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutes will prevail even if the consequences of those interpreta-
tions is to produce invalidity or to raise serious constitutional doubts."
95. 111 S. Ct. at 1780 (quoting Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S at 750). See supra note 88
and accompanying text.
96. 111 S. Ct. at 1780.
97. Id.
1992]
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speech."" According to Justice Blackmun, it cannot seriously be disputed
that the regulation prohibitions on abortion counseling and referral are content-
regulation of speech.99 "The First Amendment's hostility to content-based
regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to
prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic.""° Yet, Justice Blackmun
found the majority compelled anti-abortion speech on one hand while
suppressing speech favorable to abortion on the other.101 For instance,
HHS's own description of its regulations shows that,
Title X projects are required to facilitate access to prenatal care and social
services, including adoption services, that might be needed by the pregnant
client to promote her well-being and that of her child, while making it
abundantly clear that the project is not permitted to promote abortion by
facilitating access to abortion through the referral process."°
Justice Blackmun found it remarkable that the majority concluded that
"the Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has
merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of another.""° The
claim that Title X is merely limited to preventative services was also
misleading since "[iun addition to requiring referral for prenatal care and
adoption services, the regulations permit general health services such as
physical examinations, screening for breast cancer, treatment of gynecologi-
cal problems, and treatment for sexually transmitted diseases. [Similarly to
98. Id. (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958)) "To deny an exemption to claimants
who engage in certain forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech... The
denial is 'frankly aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas.'" 357 U.S. at 518-19 (quoting
American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950).
"A regulation of speech that is motivated by nothing more than a desire to curtail
expression of a particular point of view on controversial issues of general interest is the purest
example of 'a law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.'" Rust, 111 S. Ct. at
1780 (quoting Federal Communications Comm'n v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S.
364, 383-84 (1984)).
"[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." 111 S. Ct. at
1780 (quoting Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (ordinance forbidding
all picketing within 150 feet of a school except peaceable labor disputes, is void for over-
breadth)).
99. 111 S. Ct. at 1781.
100. Id. (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447
U.S. 530, 546 (1980)).
101. Id. discussing 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(2) (1990) which provides that after a client is
diagnosed as pregnant, "the project refers the women for prenatal pregnancy care rather than
providing 'options counseling,' which could violate Section 1008 by influencing her choice
towards abortion."
42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(4) does not prohibit providing information "medically necessary to
assess the risks and benefits of different methods of contraception," so long as no abortion
counseling is made.
102. 111 S. Ct. at 1781 (quoting 53 Fed. Reg. 2927 (1988) (emphasis in opinion)).
103. Id.
16
California Western Law Review, Vol. 29 [1992], No. 1, Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol29/iss1/5
1992] GOVERNMENT FUNDING IN TITLE X PROJECTS
abortion information] [n]one of these medical services are strictly preventa-
tive preconceptional services." 4
Furthermore, Justice Blackmun rejected the majority's holding on
"advocacy."105 The case the majority relied on was Regan v. Taxation
With Representation of Washington,"° which held that the government has
no obligation to subsidize a private party's efforts to petition the legislature
on its views."° However, in Rust, the advocacy issues are extended to "all
speech having the effect of encouraging, promoting, or advocating abortion
. . ."101 These provisions, Justice Blackmun says, "intrude upon a wide
range of communicative conduct including the very words spoken to a
woman by her physician."" °  The result of such regulation is that it
impermissibly forces each petitioner "to be an instrument for fostering public
adherence to an ideological point of view [he or she] finds unaccept-
able.""' This intrusive, ideologically based regulation, Justice Blackmun
said, "goes far beyond the narrow lobbying limitations approved in Regan,
and cannot be justified simply because it is a condition upon the receipt of
a governmental benefit.""'
The dissent states that a woman seeking the services of Title X has every
reason to expect that "her physician will not withhold relevant information
regarding the very purpose of her visit."' To hold that the doctor-patient
relationship is less worthy or substantial when the patient lacks resources to
seek a non-government provider, ignores the situation of a vast number of
Americans. Justice Blackmun quoted Justice Marshall in saying, "[i]t is
perfectly proper for judges to disagree about what the Constitution requires.
But it is disgraceful for an interpretation of the Constitution to be premised
upon unfounded assumptions about how people live."" 3
The challenged regulations did violate the First Amendment rights of
Title X staff members, according to the dissent. They explained that the
104. Id. n.2.
105. Id. at 1782 (the requirement to not encourage, promote or advocate abortion, prohibits
actions to assist women to obtain abortions or increase the availability or accessibility of abortion
for family planning purposes, far beyond lobbying efforts. The regulations do not, however,
proscribe or even regulate anti-abortion advocacy).
106. Id. (citing Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983)
(discussing a content neutral provision in a tax code involving not-for-profits)).
107. Regan, 461 U.S. at 546 (quoting Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513
(1959)) (discussing F.I.T. laws) (Douglas, J., concurring) (consistent with First Amendment
constraints, the government may not manipulate subsidy programs in a way aimed at the
suppression of ideas it considers undesirable)).
108. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1782.
109. Id.
110. Id. (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1972)) (holding that a State
cannot require an individual to disseminate an ideological message on his car license plate).
111. 111 S. Ct. at 1782.
112. Id. at 1782 n.3.
113. Id. (quoting United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 460 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(discussing a refusal of an indigent's request to have fees waived for a bankruptcy filing)).
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deprivation was a result of the limitation on the staff's freedom of expression
as a consequence of their decision to accept employment at a federally funded
project.114 "[lt has never been sufficient to justify an otherwise unconsti-
tutional condition upon public employment that an employee may escape the
condition by relinquishing his or her job.""5  According to Justice
Blackmun, "[it is beyond question 'that a government may not require an
individual to relinquish rights guaranteed him by the First Amendment as a
condition of public employment.'"' 16
In his last point, Justice Blackmun asserted his doubts: "[O]ne can
imagine no legitimate governmental interest that might be served by
suppressing such information."" 7 "[F]reedom to differ," he added, "is not
limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of
freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch
the heart of the existing order."11 In the view of Justice Blackmun, in the
past, "the Court has allowed to stand only those restrictions upon reproduc-
tive freedom that, while limiting the availability of abortion, have left intact
a woman's ability to decide without coercion whether she will continue her
pregnancy to term." 9 The majority's decision in Rust, "places formidable
obstacles in the path of Title X clients' freedom of choice and thereby
violates their Fifth Amendment rights.""2 Both the purpose and the result
of the new regulations is to deny women the ability to choose their
114. 111 S. Ct. at 1783.
115. Id. at 1782.
116. Id. (quoting Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977) which
cited Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 357-60 (1976)); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972);
and Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). Justice Blackmun also noted that:
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even though a person
has no "right" to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the government
may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon
which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis
that infringes his constitutionally protected interests-especially, his interest in
freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because
of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms
would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the government to
'produce a result which [it] could not command directly.'
Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1782-83 (quoting Perry, 408 U.S. at 597).
117. 111 S. Ct. at 1784. Justice Blackmun can give no legitimate reason for the
suppression, some commentors agree and have offered speculation applicable to the subject. See
Dean Pappas, The Independent Sector and the Tax Law: Defining Charity in an Ideal
Democracy, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 461, (1991). By controlling funding for charitable deduction,
the government can lead some organizations into financial ruin. Conditional government funding
to non-profits could include attempts to regulate abortion clinics and free speech.
118. 111 S. Ct. at 1784 (citing West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943) (holding that a compulsory pledge of allegiance in public schools was unconstitutional)).
119. Id. (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (defeating an indigent's right to a non-
medically necessary abortion, even though the State chose to pay child birth expenses) Webster
v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), and Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980)). See supra notes 27, 76, 77, and infra note 214 and accompanying text.
120. 111 S. Ct. at 1785.
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reproductive destiny. That result is not the consequence of poverty, but of
the government's deliberate, "ill-intentioned distortion of information it has
chosen to provide."12 For Justice Blackmun, "the majority disregards
established principles of law and contorts this Court's decided cases to arrive
at its preordained result."1 "
II. ANALYSIS
A. Constitutional Issues
1. Liberty
One importance of Rust lies in the battle between the justices over the
process of characterizing the issues, and the resulting "viewpoint decision"
which has been imposed, to some degree, on all Americans. z2 The
majority used the "tool" of characterization to examine and resolve the issues
of this case. Once defined or characterized the conflicting interests were
then balanced by the majority by applying selective case and statutory
law.1" For instance, "Liberty" is a majestic term, a concept which gathers
meaning from the whole of our social, legal and political environment.
Concepts such as liberty, change with the changes in our society."z It is
elementary that liberty, as protected under the Constitution, extends far
beyond the mere basic freedom from physical restraints. Liberty is protected
under the Due Process Clause which has been held to extend to such
intangibles as the freedom to marry, 12 to use contraceptives, 127 or even
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1786.
123. The new regulations arguably violate the First Amendment by impermissibly
discriminating on the basis of view-point. This is true because the regulations require no
counseling, referral, or even discussion on the lawful option of abortion, while at the same time
compelling the provider to give unweighted information promoting the continuation of
pregnancy. See 111 S. Ct. at 1781, 1782, explaining the dissents view that the regulations
violate the free speech rights of private health care organizations that receive and co-fund Title
X programs, as well as their staff, and their patients, because they impose view-point-
discriminatory conditions on government subsidies.
See also Justice Blackmun's dissent, I I I S. Ct. at 1780 (citing Regan v. Taxation With
Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983)) where the dissent argues that
government may not place certain conditions on the receipt of federal subsidies, and it may not
"discriminate invidiously in its subsidies in such a way as to 'ai[m] at the suppression of
dangerous ideas.'"
124. Because the majority chose a very specific non-constitutional way to characterize the
plaintiff's interests the majority avoided any deeper vision into the constitutional basis of the
important matters before the Court. See e.g., Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1786, illustrating Justice's
Blackmun's comment that the majority merely manipulated the law to arrive at a preordained
result.
125. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972).
126. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967). The Court invalidated a statute addressing
anti-miscegenation as institutionalizing "White Supremacy."
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the decision to bear children.s In challenges of a controversial nature,
such as those involving reproductive freedom, one of the first determinations
of the Court, must be to establish what interests are involved.' 9
Beginning in 1965 with Griswold v. Connecticut,"r where the court
identified an interest in reproductive privacy, and later in Eisenstadt v.
Baird,13 1 clarifying an interest in individual, as opposed to marital sexual
privacy, and later still in Roe v. Wade,3 2 protecting an interest in self-
determination, the Court first defined and then protected a specific interest
in the area of constitutional rights called privacy. If the characterizations of
the Court had been too narrow, the Court may have denied Constitutional
protection, because it would have determined that the issues laid outside the
scope of a constitutional guarantees.13  After characterizing issues as
liberty issues, the Court was able to demonstrate support, and a right to
protection of privacy in terms of fundamental, constitutional rights and
freedoms. Once an interest is characterized as a particular liberty or freedom
issue, the Court may then balance the private interest, the risk of erroneous
127. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending the right to use contraception to
unmarried persons) and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (in which the
Court characterized the married couples right to use contraceptives, as a general right of
privacy).
128. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). In La Fleur, the Court held
that mandatory maternity leave infringed upon the freedom of personal choice in the private
decision to have children. The Court found this was a violation of due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (referring as well,
to liberty in their concurring opinions); Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1786 (discussing the deprivation of
liberty affecting the Title X segment population); and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)
(where the Court based the right to privacy for a women's choice of abortion in exercising her
reproductive rights, on the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty).
129. See Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1767 (illuminating the process of the Court in structuring its
starting points for departure).
130. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Giswold, the Court determined that an interest could be
characterized as an interest in privacy from governmental intrusion into the marital choice of
breeding. The Court found that the use of contraceptives was a protected right within that
freedom of choice.
131. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
132. 410 U.S. 113. See supra notes 27, 77 and accompanying texts. Roe held that women
have the fundamental liberty to choose whether to give birth, and so before viability the state
has no compelling interest which could override an individual's decision.
See also Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 429-30 (1983)
(construing Roe, which holds that "a pregnant woman must be permitted, in consultation with
her physician, to decide to have an abortion and to effectuate that decision free of interference
by the State.") See Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1784, discussing liberty and its meaning, as well as
discussing Akron and Roe, both of which support the idea that by damming the flow of
information from the physician to the patient, the Secretary's regulations impermissibly impede
a women's exercise of her constitutional right od privacy.
133. Rust, IIl S. Ct. at 1778-79 (where Justice Blackmun's dissent addressed how the
majority dealt with this issue).
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deprivation, and the government's interest against the great weight of our
historical constitutional guarantees. 134
The Constitution was made to protect a new country formed from
diverse and mostly immigrant populations possessing fundamentally differing
views. The accident of view-point on abortion as natural, novel, or even
shocking, when reflected in regulations does not pre-determine their
constitutionality. Since non-enumerated Constitutional rights are retained by
the people under the Ninth Amendment, the customary privileges and
immunities are sheltered by the right to privacy and liberty concepts. The
potentiality of viability in embryotic life is not an historically protected state
interest under European or American law, and therefore, the decisional
authority over choice must remain with the woman and not the state.
In Rust, the majority used several specific characterizations of the issues,
and placed all the contest outside the scope of constitutional freedoms. The
majority literally announced that the challenged regulations, "do not
raise.. . 'grave and doubtful constitutional questions.'"135 This deliberate
mischaracterization allowed the majority to reach the implicit conclusion that
the constitutional rights of the poor, are somehow different from those
shared by the rest of society. Assuming administrative agencies are not
wastefully spending taxpayer funds, the decision also implicitly suggests that
the Secretary's old regulations were somehow at fault. This implied fault is
indicated by the very need to have spent taxpayer's money to reinterpret the
regulations, 6ven though no actual abuse had occurred or was cited."z
Dr. Rust and his co-petitioners, however, regardless of the deliberate
mis-characterization of their position, did raise basic issues asserting
134. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 335 (1976) (addressing a denial of Soo. See.
benefits) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)) (where a failure to notify
a natural father of the pending adoption of his allegedly unsupported son was held to be a
violation of due process). Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.
See J. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA 167 (1978) (hypothesizing that Protestant fears about
keeping up with the reproductive rates of Catholic immigrants played a greater role in enacting
anti-abortion laws in nineteenth-century America than did Catholic opposition to abortion.) See
Dawn E. Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts With Women's Constitutional Rights to
Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 601 (1986) ("The fetus was not given
any rights independent of its mother; rather, it was only after the fetus became a person at birth
that it acquired legal rights as a separate entity.").
135. 111 S. Ct. at 1771 (quoting United States v. Delaware and Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366,
408 (1909)).
136. 111 S. Ct. at 1769, 1788 (where Justice Stevens remarks on this by noting that the
Secretary's new regulations represent an assumption of policy making duties reserved to
Congress). See supra notes 17, 35 and accompanying texts on the lack of instances of abuse
under the old regulations. The fact that two courts of appeals and a divided majority of the
Supreme Court could differ clearly indicates that constitutional issues are implicated.
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fundamental rights. Their issue was the denial of First and Fifth Amendment
rights for themselves and women, by affirmative government interference in
reproductive planning projects.137 In Roe v. Wade, and its progeny,138
the Court laid out the value of reproductive freedom quite clearly.
"'[L]iberty,' if it means anything, must entail freedom from govermnental
domination in making the most intimate and personal decisions." '39 In
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.," the Court held that
the government's interest in ensuring that a pregnant woman receives the
relevant medical information "will not justify abortion regulations designed
to influence the woman's informed choice between abortion or child-
birth. 1 41
Rust is but a part of a line of cases which illustrate the struggle between
Americans who want to preserve America's social diversity and freedom
options based on liberty principles, and those who wish to limit those
freedoms.142  Some Americans perceived that "dangerous ideas" come
from too much social diversity and freedom. 43 Similar to our genetic and
biological needs, however, diversity in and freedom of expression offer
essential challenges to and benefits for the ongoing evolution of our society.
Since Dr. Rust's complaint alleged violation of constitutionally based
freedoms, in part based on the regulation's imposition of viewpoint based
restrictions, core constitutional values are central to the case.1" The mis-
characterization the majority employed, conveniently allowed them to deal
137. Id. at 1781. See Roe v.Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and its progeny for an in depth
treatment of a woman's fundamental, constitutionally protected right to self-determination.
138. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cen. Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) defining the viability of a fetus, a duty to preserve life, and a
denial of spousal consent requirements. See Lawrence H. Tribe, The Abortion Funding
Conundrum: Inalienable Rights and the Dilemma ofDependance, 99 HARV. L. REV. 330 (1985)
(debating the obstacle/benefit distinction in abortion funding cases).
139. 111 S. Ct. at 1784 (explaining that the Fifth Amendment protects a pregnant women's
right to be free of affirmative government interference in her decision).
140. 462 U.S. 416 (1983). See supra note 132 and infra note 160 and accompanying texts.
141. 111 S. Ct. at 1784 (construing Akron, 462 U.S. at 429-30). In Akron, the State of
Ohio passed an ordinance requiring all abortions performed after the first trimester of pregnancy
to be performed in a hospital. The Supreme Court found the section unconstitutional. Id. at
1784 also citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 464, 473 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,
599, 600 & nn. 24, 26 (1977)) (noting that abortion cases "recognize a constitutionally protected
interest 'in making certain kinds of important decisions' free from governmental compulsion."),
In Maher, 432 U.S. at 464, the Court upheld a statute allowing medicaid recipients
payments for medical services related to childbirth, but denying such payments for non-
therapeutic abortions. "There is a basic difference between direct state interference with a
protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with legislative
policy." Id. at 475. Maher dealt with the funding of abortions in a federal program, and did
not address information or referral.
142. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1784 (discussing a test of freedom rights as the right to differ.)
143. Id. at 1772, 1780.
144. Id. at 1779. This perspective is verified by the fact that two of the three Court of
Appeals which reviewed the challenges to the regulations invalidated them on constitutional
grounds, Massachusetts v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 899 F.2d 53 (1990), and
Planned Parenthood Federation v. Sullivan, 913 F.2d 1492 (10th Cir. 1990).
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with the petitioner's interests outside the context of constitutionally protected
rights. This permitted the majority to base their decision on the relatively
simplistic question of whether the Secretary of HHS had the authority to
revise its own regulations, and not the weightier question of whether the
form of those revisions were functionally needed or constitutionally
appropriate."
The majority used the characterization "tool" in several other situations
as well. For instance, the majority permitted characterization of the Act's
term "abortion as a method of family planning" as including the mere
counseling of abortion, its procedures, risks and provider list."4 Informa-
tion is not a form of birth control. This is a new and unique view in
definitional terms.14 As an initial premise, "family planning" refers to the
process by which individuals ordinarily regulate their reproductive fertility
and sexual potency to make it more or less likely they will reproduce.
Abortion preserves individual bodily integrity when "family planning" has
failed to limit fertility or sexual potency for whatever reason. Abortion is
clearly not a method of "family planning" because its function does not make
it more or less likely that an individual would undergo reproduction. The
mere counseling on a common and potentially dangerous medical procedure
called abortion, its processes, risks and provider list cannot, itself, be
considered to encourage abortion as a method of "family planning. " 1
The majority also mistakenly essentially characterized the government's:(1) intrusion into the grantee-providers' and their staff's freedom of
expression, as a permissible cost of employment within a Title X project;149
145. 111 S. Ct. at 1788 (in Justice O'Connor's dissent she touches upon the constitutional
and policy making aspects of the Secretary's regulations and their unreasonable interpretations
of the statute, as one contrary to the intent of Congress).
146. Id. at 1768, 1769. See also Rust, 889 F.2d at 407. The Court of Appeals stated that
a program that counsels use of a particular contraceptive device plainly treats that device as a
"method of family planning." Affirmed by the majority, this decision still lacks a logical base.
A doctor who counsels a patient on the procedures and potential hazards of the medical
procedure called abortion is not necessarily promoting the idea that the patient have one.
Similarly, a stock broker who counsels a client on govemment or junk bonds is not necessarily
promoting them. The words advising, informing, educating allhave completely separatemeanings from the word promoting. Information on mutual funds or stocks, or on theConstitutional right of abortion is not analogues to promoting any of them. Information and the
freedom to communicate ideas, even unpleasant ones is a right under the Constitution.
147. 111 S. Ct. at 1786-88. Justice Steven notes the majority's lack of attention to the fact
that the statute has been consistently interpreted for over 18 years and four presidents. His
dissent qualifies the regulations as prohibiting conduct, not speech, and gives several examples
of other regulations that underscore this distinction.
148. Abortion is more appropriately categorized as a related medical service, much as are
treatments for sexually transmitted diseases, adoption services, and breast cancer screenings, all
of which are a part of the Title X health services program. Id. at 1781 n.2. See also id. at
1783 discussing the physician's ethical duty to the patient to advise on all medical options.
149. Id. at 1775. See id. at 1779 (noting that the Tenth Circuit found the regulations to
"fal[l] squarely within the prohibition in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) ...against intrusion into the advice a woman requested
from or is given by her doctor.")
1992]
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(2) intrusion into the doctor/patient relationship as permissible, as long as it
remained within the context of Title X projects; sc (3) intrusion into the
client's right to medical self-determination without coercion as the price of
government assistance;"' (4) intrusion into the duty doctors' owe to their
patients and professional oath as permissibly intermittent and conditional; 52
and (5) intrusion into the grantee-providers' freedom of expression by virtue
of matching funds in Title X projects, as non-existent. 53
2. First and Fifth Amendment Rights
The majority has held that individuals employed in Title X projects must
relinquish their free speech and adhere to the regulation's imposed restric-
tions as a job requirement.154 This was not unconstitutional, they ex-
plained, as it was a condition of employment in a Title X program,
employment in which is not mandatory. Such a gross denial of basic
freedoms does not, according to the majority, raise "grave and doubtful
constitutional questions." 55 The decision implies that such restrictions on
basic First and Fifth Amendment freedoms of speech and self-determination,
are merely time and place restrictions and, therefore, are not pertinent to the
basic exercise of constitutional rights of free expression and the exchange of
ideas and information. However, the time and place restrictions on the free
speech of Title X providers is their entire working lives.
No constitutional right, for ourselves or our forefathers, has ever
previously been found to rely on the manner of a person's employment or
their choice of health care provider. America's constitutional freedoms are
not for sale, especially not in a government buy-back program which it
packages in the guise of a desperately needed health care program for poor
Americans. It is despicable for the government to bribe the poor and
helpless into relinquishing their fundamental American rights with a health
entitlement program in the guise of a public charity.
It is the clear duty of government to care for the poor of our society.
A duty which is performed for its own sake, not as a political business
The First Circuit, en bane found the regulations to violate both the privacy rights of the
Title X patients and the First Amendment rights of Title X grantee-providers. A bare majority
of the Justices in Rust reached the opposite result. That alone demonstrates that important
questions of constitutionality were suspect and strongly suggests that the outcome was
impermissibly view-point directed.
150. 111 S. Ct. at 1777-78.
151. Id. at 1776-77.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1775.
154. Id. See generally Alan E. Brownstein & Stephen M. Hankins, Pruning Pruneyard:
Limiting Free Speech Rights Under State Constitutions On the Property Of Private Medical
Clinics Providing Abortion Services, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1073 (1991) (discussing the
conflict of government controlled speech and commercial free speech).
155. 111 S. Ct. at 1771.
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venture in buying up constitutional rights." Even if an American can ever
bargain away his or her constitutional rights, it should never happen as
between the government and their charge; the poor. The uneven bargaining
power of the government alone in such a contract would invalidate it.
Freedoms in America can never be exclusively for the privileged who can
afford them.
The Public Health Services Act did not preordain the unfair result which
the majority imposed. "Not a word in the statute, however, authorizes the
Secretary to impose any restrictions on the dissemination of truthful
information or professional advice by grant recipients."" It is the
majority's decision that differentiates the distribution of basic freedom of
information and expression between the social classes."
The Secretary's regulations impermissibly interfered with the Title X
client's First and Fifth Amendment rights to receive information about
reproduction, and the grantee-providers' First and Fifth Amendment rights
to provide pertinent and necessary medical information.159 Under the
holding in Rust, the majority invites government violation of the petitioner's
constitutional rights, and control of free speech in professional relationships.
The majority superficially evaded responsibility for this offensive result by
attempting to distinguish Akron v. Akron," ° and Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,' on a "post-hoc" basis. 62
They claimed that the government's intrusion into the doctor/patient dialogue
(invalidated in those cases) applied to all physicians, while the restrictive
regulations in Rust, pertain only to a class of health care providers employed
at Title X projects."
This characterization is both misleading and incorrect. The rights
protected in Akron, and Thornburgh, are constitutionally protected personal
156. See generally Richard Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the
Limits of Consent, 102 HARv. L. REv. 4, 6 (1988) (describing unconstitutional government
conditioning of public benefits).
157. 111 S. Ct. 1787 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 1779, 1783 (this is implicit in the conditioning of a public benefit).
159. Id. at 1782.
160. Id. at 1777 (citing to Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S.
416 (1983) (invalidating an ordinance requiring all physicians to make specific statements to
patients)). See supra notes 132, 140, 141, and infra notes 162, 171, 178 and accompanying
text.
161. Id. at 1777 (citing Thomburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
gists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (invalidating a state statue mandating a list of agencies offering
alternatives to abortion)). See supra note 149, and infra notes 162, 165, 178, and accompanying
text.
162. Id. at 1777 (noting that the majority felt it critical in the Akron and Thornburgh
decisions that all doctors within the jurisdictions would be required to provide specified
information on abortion. In contrast, the majority said, in Rust a doctor's right to give and a
women's right to receive information on abortion are unfettered outside the Title X project).
See also id. at 1775, and 1785 (noting the majority's comment that the new regulations leave
a client in the same position as if the government had never enacted Title VII).
163. Id. at 1777.
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rights, not rights bestowed or denied by virtue of government or non-
government supplemented employment or health plan participation.'" The
very essence of a constitutional right is that it is shared by all Americans.
The manipulation of the doctor/patent dialogue is clearly an effort "to deter
a woman from making a decision that, with her physician, is hers to
make."165
The Secretary's regulations required doctors in Title X projects to refer
a pregnant woman to pre-natal care regardless of her personal medical
situation or preference. Should the indigent client be informed and verbal
enough to inquire about her abortion option, the regulations then require the
doctor to respond that "the project does not consider abortion an appropriate
method of family planning and therefore does not counsel or refer for
abortion."" 6 The doctor's words are controlled by government, and not
by medical opinion, the oath of the profession, or the needs of the patient.
The poor, and mostly uneducated Title X client is likely to construe the
carefully phased dictated response from her doctor as balanced medical
advice. If she then foregoes her option to seek an abortion, it may be due
in great part to the impact of this essentially "pre-recorded" government
message presented through a trusted figure, her doctor.
Upon hearing this "advice" women will either carry the pregnancy to
term, or seek a non-Title X program to assist them with coping with the
failure of family planning practices to regulate the growth of their family.
However, because the regulations hinder the flow of information to the
pregnant, possibly frightened and confused client, the receipt of further
information on all available services could be substantially delayed. The
decision in Rust could re-open wide the door to illegal and unconstitutional
later-stage abortions. 1 The medical soundness of the abortion procedure
is presently lessened as the pregnancy advances, thereby substantially
increasing the risk to the woman. The result of the Secretary's dictatorial
regulations is to lessen the incident of abortion by interrupting the flow of
164. In Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762, the Court disapproved a requirement that a physician
provide a woman with a list of agencies offering alternatives to abortion, finding it to be
"nothing less than an outright attempt to wedge the [State]'s message discouraging abortion into
the privacy of the informed-consent dialogue between the woman and her physician." Accord,
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) (supporting the proposition); see Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
165. 111 S. Ct. at 1786 (quoting Thornburgh, 467 U.S. at 474, 759).
166. 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(b)(5). Yet, according to Justice Stevens in his dissent, "[nlet a word
in the statute, however, authorizes the Secretary to impose any restrictions on the dissemination
of truthful information or professional advice by grant recipients." I I S. Ct. at 1787.
See also 111 S. Ct. at 1788. Justice Stevens stated in his dissent that "In a society that
abhors censorship and in which policymakers have traditionally placed the highest value on the
freedom to communicate, it is unrealistic to conclude that statutory authority to regulate conduct
implicitly authorized the Executive to regulate speech." Id.
167. Id. at 1785.
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information at the risk of the general well-being of women in the program
and their families." s
By suppressing medically pertinent information and interjecting a non-
medically related, physician delivered ideological message, the government
imposes "formidable obstacles" on the client's freedom of choice.IW9 Such
impositions by government violate the indigent-client's Fifth Amendment
rights. 170
In our society, the doctor/patient dialogue embodies a unique relationship
of trust. The specialized nature of medical science and the emotional
distress often attendant to health-related decisions requires that patients place
their complete confidence, and often their lives, in the hands of medical
professionals. One seeks a physician's aid not only for medication or
diagnosis, but also for guidance, professional judgment, and vital emotional
support. Accordingly, each of us attaches profound importance and
authority to the words of advice spoken by the physician. 171
In approving the regulations, the majority ignored that entire line of cases
which warns, that regulations tending to "confine the attending physician in
an undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket in the practice of his profession,"
are absurd.'
The majority offhandedly announced that it did not need to consider the
intrusion caused by the new regulations on the professionals or their clients
as the Title X regulations do not significantly impinge upon them or the
doctor-patient relationship."7 The majority justified the federal govern-
ment's interjection by stating that the regulations did not require the
professional to say anything that they did not hold true.174 The Court
ignored the fact that the withholding of information is also a communication,
that such non-information is deliberate misinformation, and that the "profes-
168. Id. at 1782 n.3, and 1785 (discussing a women's expectations in dealing with her
doctor, and the impact of misinformation, or no information).
169. Id. at 1785.
170. Id. (noting that "It is crystal-clear that the aim of the challenged provisions ... is not
simply to ensure that federal funds are not used to perform abortions, but to 'reduce the
incidence of abortion.'")
171. Id. See also id. at 1785-86 (citing Akron, 462 U.S. at 447) which quoted Colautti v.
Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 387 (1979) ("[I]n Roe and subsequent [doctor/patient] cases we have
'stressed repeatedly the central role of the physician, both in consulting with the woman about
whether or not to have an abortion, and in determining how any abortion was to be carried
out.'"); supra note 132 and accompanying text.
172. 111 S. Ct. at 1786 (citing Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52, 67, n.8 (1976)).
173. Id. at 1776. See New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d at 415 (citing Carole I. Chevin, The
Title X Family Planning Gag Rule: Can the Government Buy Up Constitutional Rights?, 41
STANFORD, L. REV. 401, 408 (1989)) (stating that of the 4.3 million people that Title X serves,
out of its target population of 14.5 million women, all have incomes 150% below the poverty
line). In light of these figures it seems quite possible that Title X programs are the only care
these women might obtain. It also seems possible that many do not understand English, or know
how to go about questioning a doctor, or inquiring about their rights.
174. 111 S. Ct. at 1776.
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sional" is ethically bound to inform the client on all relevant matters. This
is true because within the professional-client relationship, it is the client who
makes the decision once given the options by the informed professional.
Without a single poll, or statistical guide of any kind the majority came
to the startling conclusion that the expectations of the patient-recipients, as to
whether they would be receiving comprehensive medical advice, was non-
existent.175 According to the majority, the program does not provide post-
conception medical care and so, therefore, a doctor's silence regarding
abortion options could not "reasonably be thought to mislead a client into
thinking that the doctor does not consider abortion an appropriate option for
her." 76 But this reliance, based in part on the claim that Title X is merely
limited to preventative services is misleading, since in addition to requiring
referral for prenatal care and adoption services, the regulations permit general
health services such as physical examinations, screening for breast cancer,
treatment of gynecological problems, and treatment for sexually transmitted
diseases." In light of these non family planning, gynecological services,
and the congressional mandate of a broad based health program, the client
would more likely get the impression that the physicians silence on abortion
meant abortion was not medically appropriate for her, or possibly that it was
illegal.
The patient is denied complete professional information before making a
medical decision. The regulations, thus violated the woman's Fifth Amend-
ment right to medical self-determination, and sabotaged her informed decision
powers.178 Dr. Rust showed, that since recipients of Title X funding
projects are indigent, these women will be forced to relinquish their
constitutionally protected right of abortion because they will no longer have
meaningful access to abortion. The majority has construed a self-serving
legislative policy which, burdens and practically eliminates the Title X client's
access to abortion. The new regulations gut the intent of Congress in enacting
Title X as part of a comprehensive health program, 179 and leaves the
175. Id. at 1776.
176. Id. at 1776.
177. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. See 111 S. Ct. at 1764 (discussing Title
X's funding uses as, preventive family planning services, population research, infertility
services, and other related medical, informational, and educational activities).
178. Under Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983)
(invalidating a city ordinance requiring all doctors to make specific statements to the patient
prior to performing an abortion). The ordinance was designed to ensure the woman's consent
was informed, and under, Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 747 (1986) (striking down a state statute mandating that a list of agencies offering
alternatives to abortion and a description of fetal development be provided), the government
cannot interfere with a woman's right to make an informed and voluntary choice by placing
restrictions on the patient/doctor dialogue. Yet, in Rust, the High Court comes to the opposite
conclusion, even while they admit, "It would undoubtedly be easier for a woman seeking an
abortion if she could receive information about abortion from a Title X project. . ." The Court
concludes, however, that the Constitution does not require that the government conform its
mandated program provide that information. 111 S. Ct. at 1777-78.
179. 111 S. Ct. at 1768.
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impoverished client wanting abortion information, in a position of no benefit
from the public's tax dollars or Congressional legislation." ° It may also
leave her without adequate time in which to safely seek an abortion, if she is
confused by the restrictions or the limited medical advice.
The majority with no medical experience to determine what type of
medical resolution would best serve any particular client, dictated to the
physicians what they may and may not do. Further, permitting regulations
that unfairly benefit one healthcare provider-non-abortion providers, as
opposed to abortion providers-are arbitrary and capricious."'
The Secretary's regulations also provide nonexclusive factors for the
Secretary to consider in conducting a case-by-case finding on objective
integrity and program independence. It seems, therefore, that the survival of
health care providers will depend on how well they please the political
appointee, the Secretary."
Further, consider the test being used by the High Court." The Court
implemented a reasonable basis test. According to the majority, the
Secretary's regulations are a plausible construction of the Act, and therefore,
entitled to deference.' " But even assuming arguendo, that no constitutional
issues are raised in Rust, gender discrimination is still an issue in this case
because the new regulations clearly do not impact on men who seek
government health program assistance. Under this middle tier test reserved
for quasi-suspect classifications the burden is on the state to show a substantial
relationship to an important government objective. Outcomes such as the one
180. 111 S. Ct. at 1777. The majority wrongfully asserts that the difficulties a woman
encounters when a Title X project does not provide abortion counseling or referral leave her in
"no different position than she would have been if the government had not enacted Title X."
This is self-serving, because any delay caused by a misunderstanding as to the scope of the
regulations or the limited advice of her doctor may cause a woman to forfeit the time during
which an abortion may be safely performed. It also deprives her of the benefit of her tax dollars
which, in part, fund the Title X program.
See also 111 S. Ct. at 1785 n.5 In tort liability, commentators have pointed out that, "[i]f
there is no duty to go to the assistance of a person in difficulty or peril, there is at least a duty
to avoid any affirmative acts which make his situation worse... The same is true, of course,
of a physician who accepts a charity patient. Such a defendant will then be liable for a failure
to use reasonable care for the protection of the plaintiff's interests." Id. (quoting PAGE KEETON
Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 378 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing the duty
owed to charity patients with the view of providers as good Samaritans)).
181. 111 S. Ct. at 1765 (describing the regulations requirements in constructing the provider
list). In New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d at 415, before the Court of Appeals, in Circuit Judge
Kearse's dissent, she commented on her belief that the Secretary's new interpretation of the
regulations were capricious and violative of rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Judge Kearse
referred to 42 C.F.R.§§ 59.7, 59.10 (1988) entitled PROHIBITION ON COUNSEUNG AND
REFERRAL FOR ABORTION SERVICES. These sections state that Title X projects may not provide
counseling concerning abortion or provide referral for abortion. Judge Kearse added, "There
can be no doubt that the Secretary intends this regulation to forbid a grantee from informing a
pregnant woman of the availability of abortion and even from telling her where she can get
abortion-related information." Id. at 415-16.
182. New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401, 406. See supra note 146 and infra notes 189,
217 and accompanying texts.
183. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1767.
184. Id.
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in Rust, rally support for the argument that the better test for laws which
"work a gender classification" governed is strict scrutiny.115
3. Co-funding
The majority was incorrect in refusing to recognize that the government
cannot invade the constitutional rights of grantee-providers or client-recipients
of federally funded health-care programs, based on the existence of federal co-
funding." The label the majority gives the constitutional intrusion, e.g., a
regulatory restriction on free speech in the context of a federally funded health
maintenance project, does not accurately frame the true nature of economics
within Title X projects. That is because the Title X program requires
matching grantee-provider funds."' The Secretary's restrictions on repro-
ductive planning, therefore, affected a project where 50% of the financing is
being supplied by independent non-government sources. As discussed in FCC
v. League of Women Voters of California,"' the mere fact that government
funds are involved should not trigger, governmental viewpoint domination of
domestic health projects."t 9
185. See PAUL BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING, Classification
Based on Sex 576-621 (2d ed. 1983). See generally James M. McGoldrick, Jr., The Separation
of Powers Doctrine: Straining Out Gnats, Swallowing Camels, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 95 (1990)
(discussing aspects of recent Supreme Court decisions that indicate an intrusion by the Court into
the powers of Congress, and the proper test for gender discrimination cases).
186. It is the duty of government to support the constitution, not to promote view-point
implementation of publicly funded medical programs. The Secretary's prompting for new
regulations came from an executive office. The administration may be using public funds to
deliver its political message, and appease its political supporters. View-point judicial decisions
are allowing the politicalization of the judiciary, and an erosion of the Separation of Powers
doctrine.
187. 111 S. Ct. at 1775. The providers argued that the required matching funds aspect of
Title X invalidated the regulations because they penalized privately funded speech.
188. Id. (citing Federal Communications Comm'n v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468
U.S. 364 (1984) (refusing to ban editorials from stations receiving federal financial aid)). See
infra note 212 and accompanying text.
189. Federal Communications Comm'n, 468 U.S. at 400. The Court invalidated a federal
law providing that noncommercial television and radio stations that obtained federal funds were
"barred absolutely from all editorializing" because it "is not able to segregate its activities
according to the source of its funding," and thus, "has no way of limiting the use of its federal
funds to all non-editorializing activities." The law in FCC would have had the effect that a
noncommercial education station that received only 1% of its overall income from [federal]
grants is barred absolutely from all editorializing, "and barred from using even wholly private
funds to finance its editorial activity." The Court recognized that were Congress to permit the
recipient stations to establish 'affiliate' organizations which could then use the station's faculties
to editorialize with non-federal funds, the statute "would plainly be valid." In FCC, however,
the Court did not require separate facilities for the non-federally funded activities.
Because Title X requires that grant recipient providers contribute to the financing of Title
X projects through matching funds and grants, the regulation's restrictions on abortion
counseling and advocacy penalize privately funded speech. Under FCC, the larger the health
care facility of the grantee the more intrusive on free speech the regulations would become.
This is true because the ratio of Title X federal funds to the grantee's total income from other
sources would be small.
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Title X offers subsidies. The denial of subsidies based on any viewpoint,
nonetheless a neutral viewpoint (as existed under the old HHS regulations),
is unconstitutional under precedent. 1" The denial of subsidies is meant to
regulate what some Americans believe are "dangerous ideas." 19" ' This
philosophy ignores the fact that diversity, and tolerance of diversity are
necessary ingredients in our "New World." Justice Stevens dissenting, said,
"[l]ike the statute itself, the regulations prohibited conduct, not speech."" 2
Beyond the contradictions raised by the majority's decision and the
precedent cases such as FCC, on co-funding issues, is the Court's decision in
United States v. Kokinda.93 There, the Court recognized that the existence
of a government subsidy, in the form of property, did not justify restriction
of free speech in areas that had "been traditionally open to the public for
expressive activity."" This holding should clearly apply to the area of
publicly funded health services like Title X which often take place in
educational institutions. Similarly, the Court has recognized that universities,
and other educational institutions that could receive Title X funds, are
traditional spheres of free expression, "so fundamental to the functioning of
our society . ,,,15 that conditions attached to the expenditure of govern-
ment funds are restricted by the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines of the
First Amendment."9 Adding to that recognition of the importance of and
fundamental need for diversified expression, by analogy the traditional
professional relationship of doctor and patient must enjoy protection under the
First and Fifth Amendments from governmental interference by way of
regulation.
190. See supra notes 77 and 128 and accompanying text (discussing due process); Rust, 111
S. Ct. at 1781 (discussing the view-point based restrictions).
191. 111 S. Ct. at 1780 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513, 518-19 (1958)) (the term "dangerous ideas" is meant to indicate diverse ideas. Accepting
the preservation of America's right to differ is central to reducing view-point government
impositions.)
192. Id. at 1787-88.
193. Id. at 1776 (citing United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3119 (1990); Hague v.
CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939); and Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,
460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (all discussing speech activity)).
194. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1776.
195. Id. The Court presents a view of universities as an oasis of free expression in isolationfrom the daily existence of most Americans. This portrayal although poetic perhaps, is a wholly
unauthorized corralling of First Amendment rights.Briefly, Title X provides about a third of all public funds for family planning clinics, or
$475,000,000 in fiscal year 1988. Four hundred clinics served 4,300,000 clients. See New
York v. Bowen, 690 F. Supp. 1261, 1263 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). It therefore, may not be practical
to condition subsidies on the forbearance of abortion counseling and maintain: that Title X's
medical services are comprehensive, cost efficient, maintain medically complete healthrecords,
or offer referrals to competent third party care providers.
196. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1776 (citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603,
605-06 (1967) (upholding a State university professor's right not to discuss possible communist
affiliations)).
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B. Constitutional Avoidance
Justice O'Connor in her dissent, put forth a powerful argument that on
the basis of improper statutory construction alone, the Secretary's interpreta-
tive regulations were invalid."9 When a particular interpretation of a statute
raises serious constitutional problems, the Court is obliged to avoid it. This
flows from the "time-honored practice" of the Court "of not reaching
constitutional questions unnecessarily." 1" Justice O'Connor stated, "In this
case, we need only tell the Secretary that his regulations are not a reasonable
interpretation of the statute."" 9 Since other acceptable constructions of the
Act which did not disturb protected constitutional rights remained available,
the Court should have construed the statute to avoid the agency's interpreta-
tive regulations from intruding on fundamental rights.
Clearly, the Secretary's former regulations did not raise constitutional
questions based on former implementation, since the reasons given by the
Secretary were admittedly based on political perceptions.' Therefore,
interpretations of the Title X legislation which did not raise inequities of
liberty and constitutional rights were possible.
C. Legislative History
The intent of the Congress is illuminated through the Act, the legislative
history, and the prior regulations. They all speak to the contrived political
result in the majority's decision?" The Court implies as an initial proposi-
tion, that general remarks found in the legislative history are not probative of
Congressional intent on narrow issues.' This position serves no function
as an investigatory tool, but it does serve to curtail investigation. Yet, the
narrow legislative inquiry being investigated in Rust, was whether the
legislative history shed any light on the scope of the terms of the Act. The
nature of the question assured that the answer could only be determined by
reviewing the remarks of Congress, which occurred during the legislative
process, and which addressed the scope of the legislation. The legislative
history provides ample examples that Congress intended the Act to be
construed broadly, such as the emphasis it puts on the proper function of the
Act as a broad-based health care program, providing comprehensive services
to all persons.'
197. 111 S. Ct. at 1788-89 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 1788.
199. Id. at 1789.
200. See supra notes 18 and 35 and accompanying text.
201. 111 S. Ct. at 1786.
202. Id. at 1770.
203. Id. Further, the lack of amendment or implementation of changes for over 18 years,
and refunding processes, are all evidence that congressional intent was satisfied.
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Section 59.9 on program integrity mandates the use of separate facilities,
personnel and records. This regulation arguably frustrates the intent of
Congress in that Title X programs are an integral part of a broader health care
system. The House Conference Report stated that the legislation does not and
is "not intended to interfere with or limit programs conducted in accordance
with State or local laws" and regulations which are supported by funds other
than those authorized under this legislation.' This would, therefore,
include state financed programs permitting abortion counseling, and private
funding regulations shared by those similarly situated to the petitioners.
Further, from a conservation of resources perspective, non-integration of
health options should be impermissible as they burden the health and tax
systems with inefficient use of public funds by necessitating duplication of
some services, equipment, and staffing.'05
The Secretary promulgated the program integrity regulations in direct
response to the executive branch's observations from the General Accounting
Office (GAO) and the Office of the Inspector General (OIG).? GAO and
OIG reported that "[b]ecause the distinction between the recipients Title X and
other activities may not be easily recognized, the public can get the impres-
sion that Federal funds are being improperly used for abortion activities."'
Yet, the supporting documentation of the program shows no abortions had
taken place under the Title X program." 3 Use of the word "activities" by
the Inspector General was deliberate to attempt to include tangential issues
like abortion information. The statute does not disallow abortion information
and such is pertinent to the "comprehensive" nature of the health care
act.' The justification given by the GAO and the OIG is completely
illusory and unjustifiable. The House and the Senate are housed in the same
building, might not this same public, in the GAO's example, just as easily get
the impression they are one and the same?
According to the Secretary, "[h]aving a program that is separate from
such activities [as abortion] is a necessary predicate to any determination that
204. Id. (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1667, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6, at 8-9 (1970),
reprinted in, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5080, 5082). See generally Clinton Broden, Emergency Room
Surgery On Abortion Rights, 6 J. L. & POL'Y 827 (1990) (discussing State challenges and
funding in great detail).
See, e.g., The New York Law Journal, Vol. 205, Number 73, Court Decisions: Hope v.
Perales, First Judicial Dept., NY County-Supreme Court, 4/17/91 N.Y.L.J. 21 (col. 6) (citing
East Meadow Community Concerts Ass'n v. Board of Education, 18 N.Y.2d 129, 133 (1966));
Madole v. Barnes, 20 N.Y. 2d 169, 173 (1967); accord, Moe v. Secretary of Administration
& Finance, 417 N.E. 2d 113. "Although the poverty of eligible women is not of the State's
creation (Maher v. Roe) and there is no constitutional obligation to pay for the medical care of
the poor (Id.), the New York State equal protection clause guarantees equal participation in state
benefits once such benefits are extended."
205. Centralization of services is crucial to keeping medical costs down, and maintaining
complete medical records.
206. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1769.
207. Id. at 1769-70.
208. New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401, 418 (1989).
209. 111 S. Ct. at 1787, 1788 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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abortion is not being included as a method of family planning in the Title X
program. "210 However, separateness of health programs is usually estab-
lished by separate funding and bookkeeping, and not by separate housing.
The confirmation of accountants and inspectors is a reasonable standard more
likely then the Secretary's to avoid waste of public funds in public health
programs. This is especially true in light of the fact that no abuses under the
prior regulatory system were alleged.
In Rust, the Court insisted that regulations requiring separate facilities
were valid regardless of whether or not the recipient grantee formed a
separate affiliate to refer and counsel clients wanting abortions.21 ' That
restraint flies in the face of FCC, where the Court recognized that sharing
physical faculties with a non benefit recipient provider was not an intrusion
on the use of public funds. 12 In fact it is a cautious and financially
resourceful method of delivering broad based health services to those in need
of public support.
The requirement of separate building facilities will provoke a massive
duplication of staff, medical equipment, and supplies for state, city, and
private providers disseminating information on abortion counseling. The
result of the new regulations will be less services for the needy and/or a
significant increase in the cost of medical services borne by the taxpayer.
Since the national budget is under the constraints of massive debt, no
corresponding increase in public funds to enable the outfitting of alternative
facilities is likely. Services to the poor will be reduced.
In 1987, the Hyde Amendment" 3 limited the appropriations under the
Act stating that: "[n]one of the Federal funds provided in this Act shall be
used to perform abortions except where the life of the mother would be
endangered if the fetus were carried to term . .."14 The Hyde Amendment
does not attempt to limit free speech pertaining to counseling or referral of
abortion procedures, or the inherent hazards associated with it. The
Amendment speaks only to the "performance" of abortion, therefore, the
amendment itself is recent testimony to the continued desire in a later
Congress to interpret the Act broadly. For instance, a Senate Report states
that:
210. Id. at 1770 (quoting 53 Fed. Reg. 2940 (1988)..
211. Id. at 1774.
212. Federal Communications Comm'n v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 400(1989). See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
213. New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d at 407 (citing the Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No.
100-202, 101 Stat. 1329-99 (1987)).
214. Id. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980) (upholding the constitutionality
of the Hyde Amendment, which denied public funds for some medically necessary abortions.
The provision "places no governmental obstacle in the path of a women who chooses to
terminate her pregnancy, but rather, by means of unequal subsidization of abortion and other
medical services, encourages alternative activity deemed in the public interest.")
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This legislation is designed to make comprehensive, voluntary family
planning services, and information relating thereto, readily available to all
persons in the United States desiring such services; to provide greatly
increased support for biomedical, behavioral, and operational research
relevant to family planning and population; to develop and disseminate
information on population growth; and to coordinate and centralize the
administration of family planning and population research programs
conducted by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.
In that same report, it states that "[tihe committee does not view family
planning as merely a euphemism for birth control. It is properly a part of
comprehensive health care and should consist of much more than the
dispension of contraception devices. "216 According to a statement of Rep.
Kyros, "[This legislation] will make an important contribution to the health
of American mothers and children. This bill will make family planning
services available to low-indome women who presently want and need but
cannot afford them and will increase the federal role in population re-
search. "217
Senator Hart said that "[This] legislation 'moves toward providing much
needed medical family planning services to millions of women who cannot
afford them, and it provides for the research that will help us better to
understand the phenomena of population growth and enable all couples to
regulate fertility according to their individual consciences.'"21
215. New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d at 408 (quoting S. REP. No. 1004, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 3 (1970), excerpted in, 116 CONG. REC. 24,094 (1970)).
216. Rust, I11 S. Ct. at 1768 n.3 (also citing the report at p. 10).
217. New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d at 408 (citing 116 Cong. Rec. 37,380).
Because the new regulations require separate facilities, and staff, as well as the usual
separate records, the costs to implement the new guidelines would necessarily be substantial.
The separateness requirement would also hamper total family health planning efforts because it
puts great emphasis on pre-natal care and causes duplicity in equipment and supplies. Sonar
machines, for instance, are quite expensive and are used in a variety of ways by health care
providers. Since shared facilities are no longer possible, the greater cost in referral for basic
testing, and the additional effort required by the indigent client wanting abortion information,
would hamper efforts to secure accessible and competent family health services.
218. New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d at 408 (citing 116 Cong. Rec. 24,093).
Not all regulatory agencies share the Secretary's view of the necessity to change regulations
because of a so called change in political climate. See generally Patricia A. Martin & Martin
L. Lagod, The Human Preembryo, The Progenitors, and the State: Toward A Dynamic Theory
Of Status, Rights, and Research Policy, 5 HIGH TECH. L. J. 257 (1990). This article discusses
the recent ban on federal funding on projects involving the transplantation of fetal tissue derived
from an elective abortion. The federal government's ban on research on fetal tissue, for
instance, was a surprise to the National Institute of Health. However, the fact that it was a
surprise to NIH is telling. Clearly, NIH did not perceive a "view-point problem" in the
research it funded. The end of research in fetal tissue may signal a greater thrust of research
in non-related biotech areas, an industry which the administration has nurtured. In biotechnolo-
gy, human DNA is often co-mingled with that of other species of plants and animals, resulting
in bio-engineered life forms. Such transgenic inventions are frequently used to produce
commercial quantities of rare disease fighting drugs. See generally Linda Maher, Environmental
Concerns: In Domestc and International Regulatory Frameworks for Biotechnology, 24
LAW/TECHNOLOGY 1, No. I (discussing the biotech field, but not commenting on the impact of
the loss of fetal tissue research to this field). See also Chryss B. The Fetal 7issue Transplant
Debate in the United States: Where is King Solomon When You Need Him?, 7 J.L. & POL. 379
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There is no section of the statute that specifically excludes abortion
counseling or referral. In validating the Court of Appeals decision, the
majority accept that congressional refunding is not demonstrative of support
for any previous administrative interpretation of the statute. The effect of the
majority's decision is a coup d'etat by the judiciary in which they permit
themselves to restrictively revise broadly intended legislation of Congress, by
a distortedly narrow reinterpretation of agency regulations. Using their
surgical procedures, the majority bypassed the function of the legislature,
which had consistently demonstrated its support for the broad based health
care program it previously implemented, revised and funded." The
legislature has reauthorized the Act numerous times, and it has specifically
rejected amending Title X to prohibit funds for counseling and referral for
abortion. What greater indication of congressional intent is needed?'
The majority declares, that general statements by members of Congress
at the time of re-funding are not conclusive.21 Yet all legal scholars know
that a search for conclusive evidence in statutory history is a misnomer. The
rules of statutory construction require weighing all relevant information to
permit reconstruction of the implicit intent of Congress.' Further, the
majority pronounced that the legislative history showing Congress' rejection
of a proposed amendment to Title X specifically prohibiting funds for
counseling and referral for abortion was not indicative of congressional
intent.' Congress, they said may have believed that the statute already
provided such restrictions.' Yet they point to no hearing where the
Secretary or other party testified to such a conclusion, and ignore the fact that
Congress authored the legislation. The majority discard central investigatory
tools and then claim they can find no evidence of the intent of Congress.
Their investigation was, therefore, over before it began.
A single agency's interpretive regulations should never be permitted to
capture and gerrymander an Act of Congress to suit an administrative
Secretary's view of how people should live. Special interest groups do not
dictate law in this country, elected congressional representatives make law.
(1991). Recent efforts in legislation impose servere constraints on fetal tissue research. Fetal
tissue research has becoming dominated by abortion politics, when the potential benefits to
mankind are potentially unlimited. Further, with the advance of biotechnology, fetal tissue
research offers superior opportunities to engineer cures for diseases, and advanced genetic
therapies.
219. See New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d at 407, 408.
220. Id. at n.2, and at 409.
221. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1768.
222. Id. at 1778, 1788 (Blackmun, J., and O'Connor, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 1768, likewise they acknowledge that the legislation does not address whether
clinics receiving Title X funds can offer non-directive counseling on abortion. Merely because
the issue was not addressed does not mean the legislative history is ambiguous on the intent of
Congress. The activity is clearly not forbidden as it is not even raised.
224. New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d at 409 (citing 124 CONG. REc. 37,046 (1978))
(statement of Rep. Rogers) ("the point of what we are doing in title X ... is to let people know
how to avoid pregnancy .... The amendment is not needed.")
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Such important congressional legislative functions should not be subject to
captured by a mere regulatory reinterpretation on the part of a single
Secretary in one administrative department of government. The majority's
decision to support this obstruction of justice is an invasion by judicial
legislation, and an assault upon the Office of the Congress and the doctrine
of Separation of Powers.'
No amendment has ever been made to in any way alter or redirect the
Secretary's initial interpretation of the regulations to provide a broad based
medical services including abortion counseling to the nation's poor. Indeed,
the Secretary has said that he has reinterpreted the regulations not because of
a continuing erroneous policy which misinterpreted Congress' original intent,
but because of social pressure "against the killing of unborn children."'
However, the Secretary's interpretation oversteps his authority. Congress and
the High Court are the only entities that can clarify at what point our society
will recognize a fertilized glob of living cells as a "child." The definition of
"child" implicit in the Secretary's phraseology cannot be found in any
dictionary, and it clearly represents a non-medical, non-neutral, politically
based, ideological preference against the existence of certain constitutional
freedoms.
D. The Winds of Change and the Clinton Administration's
Political Agenda
The recent presidential elections have brought a formal end to the
conservative and religious agenda set forth by the Reagan and Bush adminis-
trations some twelve years ago. However, it is important to remember that
the Clinton election was not won by a popular landslide. Many Americans
continue to feel justified in restricting the freedoms of other Americans for a
variety of reasons, as discussed throughout this article.
In order to bring the country together, with understanding and compas-
sion for all sides, the Clinton administration will have to weigh their
constitutional options to structure a withdrawal from the previous admin-
istration's positions in regards to Title X regulations and, in particular, the
"Gag Rule." The President has rescinded the gag rule, 7 and stated his
support for effective change in this area. However, since his announcement,
in the final days of the Bush administration, the country has been irreversibly
225. New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d at 407 (citing Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)) (noting that a regulation must reflect the intent
of Congress). See generally James M. McGoldrick, The Separation of Powers Doctrine:
Straining Out Gnats, Swallowing Camels? 18 PEPP. L. REV. 95 (1990) (discussing the Court's
use of certain tests for cases potentially raising constitutional question. For instance, the Court
may invoke a reasonable basis test or the rational basis test, and each test used can invoke
different responses and resolutions in a particular case. Some tests trigger compelling state
interests, and suspect classifications while others do not).
226. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1769.
227. Executive Order of January 22, 1993.
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involved in three major military actions, and made aware of an existing
further Bush budgetary deficit of twenty billion dollars.' The impact of
these cumulative post-election, preinaugural events, seems designed to distract
attention from President Clinton's winning domestic platform, and to untimely
complicate his already drafted budget.
However, given President Clinton's actions, no doubt domestic emphasis
will prevail, and HHS regulations and Title X will be revised. How the
President will decide to go about this revision will raise interesting issues in
constitutional law, such as the Separation of Powers. Clearly, an Executive
Order cannot function as a clarification of Congressional intent as found in
present Title X legislation, nor can it overrule the holdings of the present
conservative Supreme Court. Nor can the Bush administration's preelection
announcement of its withdrawal of support for the "Gag Rule" satisfactorily
resolve the legal issues, if in fact it has had any legal effect.
the Executive Order can, however, serve as an initial statement of policy
and demonstrate support for the many necessary changes that will have to be
undertaken at all levels of government to effectively produce change. Under
the present Supreme Court holdings, restrictive interpretations by local
administrative offices are constitutional Therefore, to effect change in the
standards now in place, new legislation, either amending aspects of Title X,
or clarifying the intent of Congress in regards to Title X, will be needed.
The scope of the effort ahead cannot be underestimated, nor may the
present election victory cloak the lengthy battle which lies ahead. The former
regime has had twelve years in which to place party members in positions of
influence over policy and funding throughout every level of government, and
in every state of the union. Because of important characteristics of govern-
ment employment, e.g., seniority, building a nationally accommodating
responsive political structure for Title X is a daunting task. The manner of
efforts put forth will impact the permanency of any solution, and ultimately
serve either to quicken or slow the pendulum of political perspective.
Any new Title X legislation realistically may be tested in state and federal
courts throughout the land. That could hold up meaningful implementation
of corrective legislation for several years. In Rust, the abusive regulations
were implemented in 1988, and ruled on by the High Court three years later,
only after incompatible circuit decisions had been handed down. During that
time, a co-plaintiff, New York City's own Corporation Counsel, experienced
a change of guard, rethought its position, and then declined to participate as
the matter proceeded to be presented before the High Court. Furthermore,
states and cities which have already implemented new HHS regulations along
Rust's lines, like New York, may protest any re-installation of the former
regulatory interpretation or any new corrective interpretation which will
inevitably impact their budgets. These impacts would be caused by the
228. Kurt Chandler, Both Sides Regroup for New Agenda on Abortion, STAR TRIBUNE, Jan.
2, 1993, at Al.
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reexpansion of comprehensive heath services under Title X, to include unified
facilities which include abortion services, as opposed to the costs of lifting the
veil of the "Gag Rule" per se.
Further, under the abusive Title X regulations requiring separate facilities
for abortion services, thousands of private contracts, leases and equipment
purchases have been stimulated. The duties under these contracts may make
it quite difficult to reintegrate abortion services into the now-existing facilities.
These factors will affect the speed and effectiveness of implementation of the
corrective changes once they are federally implemented and accepted by state
and city governments.
A particular difficulty the Clinton administration will face in reintegrating
abortion services into the mandated comprehensive medical services program
Title X was designed to be, is a permanent scare inflicted by the abuse of the
instrumentality of local administrative offices. This particular abuse was
clearly urged by the federal government under the previous administration,
but the question remains now for President Clinton: How can this instrumen-
tality of political agenda be disarmed, to curtail its continued interjections into
the day-to-day functions of government?
CONCLUSION
The majority improperly characterized Dr. Rust's allegations as devoid
of constitutionally based issues. Since other acceptable constructions of the
Act, not touching the protected area of constitutional rights were available, the
Court was required to construe the statute to avoid regulations intruding on
fundamental rights. Further, the government cannot invade the constitutional
rights of grantee-providers or client-recipients of federally funded health care
programs based on the existence of some federal co-funding. Such limits on
fundamental rights cannot be construed as job prerequisites, and the
government cannot silence diversity in America by buying up fundamental
rights from the poor.
The court is outside its realm when it legislates from the bench as it has
in Rust. The new regulations should have been set aside under statutory
construction principles, constitutional principles, or as arbitrary or capricious
in the favoring of non-abortion referral providers. The regulations impermiss-
ibly interfere with the indigent client's First and Fifth Amendment rights to
receive information and exercise rights involving health services, and the
grantee-providers' First Amendment rights to discuss all health service
options. The new regulations violate both the language and the intent of Title
X. The government has unconstitutionally conditioned receipt of a benefit on
the relinquishment of constitutional rights. Participants in Title X projects are
not free to exercise their right of free speech, and their doctors are torn from
the oaths of their profession by an intruding government. The new regula-
tions are an affirmative legal barrier to women's health care choice, and
amount to facial violations of the plaintiffs' rights to free speech, and sexual
discrimination.
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The decision leaves the indigent client wanting alternative services to pre-
natal care in a worse position then if Congress had never funded family
planning services, because she has lost time in locating relevant medical
information. Therefore, greater health risks are imposed on the indigent
client which further limit her exercise of her right to choose a legal abortion
option. Since the risk to the life of a women ending her pregnancy increases
after the first trimester, the new regulations undisputedly injure some of their
dependant clients. Effective preclusion of the grantee's right to disengage her
pregnancy has been accomplished by the majority, and not by Title X legis-
lation, or even by the indigence of the client.
Further, the protected professional doctor/patient relationship was
seriously disturbed by the majority's decision. The Constitution requires that
the Government create undistorted program mandates in order to assure her
the privacy all Americans expect in professional relationships. : A single
administrative agency's, interpretive regulations should not be permitted to
circumvent congressional legislative privilege, and permit an administrative
Secretary to dictate to people how they should live. Minor government
officers must not be permitted to use regulatory schemes to interject
themselves or their personal "viewpoints" into the protected professional
relationships of doctors and their patients, or unconstitutionally impose them
on their indigent charges.
The issues of reorganization of the comprehensive health care program
aspect of Title X, in particular, its abortions services facilities placement, are
quite complex and will be difficult to implement. Corrective HHS regulations
stimulated by the Clinton administration, and congressional cooperation, will
likely be delayed by judicial challenges, federal and local budgetary
constraints, and by existing contractual obligations. However, the tone for
change has been clearly heard in America, and the tactful persuasion of both
sides toward constructive avenues of expression will undoubtedly be carefully
explored.
229. See generally David R. Dow, The Establishment Clause Argument For Choice, 20
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 479 (1990) (discussing the fact that most commentors treat abortion
rights exclusively as a privacy issue, while it in fact may also raise Establishment Clause
implications).
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